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Abstract 
African Americans in the United States are considerably less likely to own their 
homes compared to Whites. Differences in household income and other socio-economic 
and demographic characteristics can only partially explain this gap and previous studies 
suggest that the ‘unexplained’ gap has increased over time. In this paper we use the  
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) intergenerational data, which provides 
information on household wealth, parental characteristics and macro-location choice. We 
find that African-American households are 6.5 percent less likely to own if only 
traditional explanatory variables are controlled for. However, the black-white 
homeownership gap disappears if differences in own and parental wealth and in the 
preferred macro-location type are accounted for. 
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1 Introduction 
African-American (black) households in the United States are much less likely to own their 
homes compared to Caucasian (white) households.1 Roughly three out of four white households 
own their home, while the same is true for less than half of all black households. Moreover, the 
racial difference in homeownership has widened notably over the last two decades. According to 
the Current Population Survey, the homeownership gap between Blacks and Whites has 
increased by 2.5 percentage points to 27.1 percent between 1985 and 2005. These observations 
raise the important question of how this (increasing) gap can be explained. 
Past research, which has mainly focused on disparities in demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics as determinants of the housing tenure choice (i.e., the decision whether to own or 
rent the home), can only partially explain the large homeownership gap between Blacks and 
Whites. Moreover, the ‘unexplained’ gap appears to have increased over time. Painter et al. 
(2001) investigate the housing tenure choice in the Los Angeles metropolitan area in 1980 and 
1990. They find that even when controlling for income, education and immigrant status, the gap 
has more than doubled between 1980 and 1990, to 11 percentage points. While earlier studies 
(Wachter and Megbolugbe 1992 and Yinger 1986) argue that a portion of the gap may be due to 
differences in access to housing finance, as pointed out in Painter et al. (2001), it is unlikely that 
access differentials between Blacks and Whites have worsened over time.2 Moreover, using data 
from the Survey of Consumer Finance from 1983 to 2001, a recent study by Gabriel and 
Rosenthal (2005) suggests that credit barriers account for no more than 5 percentage points of the 
roughly 25 percentage point (or higher) homeownership differential between Blacks and Whites. 
In this paper we explore the hypothesis that the unexplained black-white homeownership gap 
may be due to differences in household wealth, parental externalities (e.g., gifts to meet 
downpayment constraints) and the preferred ‘macro-location’ type (i.e., the degree of 
urbanization of the place of residence). All these variables are frequently omitted in housing 
tenure choice studies. Using intergenerational data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) we are able to jointly control for all three sets of variables. We identify an ‘unexplained’ 
gap of 6.5 percent when household wealth, parental externalities and macro-location type are not 
                                                 
1
 Subsequently we refer to African-American households as ‘Blacks’ or ‘black households’ and we refer to 
Caucasian households as ‘Whites’ or white households.  
2
 For example, as part of the Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, Congress requires 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to increase the purchase of primary-market loans to minority and low-income 
borrowers and neighborhoods. 
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controlled for. When we estimate a standard binary logit model we find that this remaining gap 
can be explained by differences in own and parental wealth and in the preferred macro-location 
type. Current parental income does not appear to have any significant impact. We find that the 
‘unexplained’ homeownership gap shrinks to less than half the size if the household’s own wealth 
is properly controlled for. Parental wealth has a statistically significant additional impact on 
housing tenure outcomes but the additional effect is quantitatively relatively small with 0.4 
percentage points. The remaining gap of roughly 1.5 percent can be entirely explained by 
different macro-location choices and the corresponding locational differences in the relative cost 
of homeownership. In fact, when controlling for macro location choices, the gap changes the 
sign, although the effect is statistically insignificant. When we reestimate the final model 
specification separately for black and white households we find that the coefficients on the 
macro-location type variables are statistically significantly different for the two groups, with 
black households being comparably less likely to own in highly urbanized locations. 
Our main findings are essentially unchanged when we address endogeneity concerns related 
to the household’s own wealth and the parents’ wealth. Instrumental variable estimates confirm 
that the household’s own wealth has a causal positive effect on the probability of 
homeownership, however, we cannot identify any statistically significant causal effect of parental 
wealth. Nevertheless, our instrumental variable estimates imply a black-white homeownership 
gap of essentially zero. Finally, we estimate a multinomial logit model, assuming that households 
simultaneously choose their housing tenure and macro-location. Overall, these estimates confirm 
our finding that the black-white homeownership gap can be explained by differences in own and 
parental wealth and in the macro-location choice of households. 
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Specifically, we 
discuss the role of own wealth, parental externalities and location in determining homeownership 
outcomes. Section 3 describes the data, in particular, our measure of household wealth. Section 4 
outlines the empirical specifications and the strategy to identify household wealth and reports 
results. We derive conclusions in Section 5. 
 
2 Determinants of Housing Tenure Outcomes 
Owner-occupied and renter-occupied housing provide dissimilar benefits to households. 
Whether households prefer owning over renting depends on a number of factors. Below we first 
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briefly outline the main relative advantages and disadvantages of homeownership compared to 
renting. Next, we discuss the role of household wealth, parental externalities and locational 
preferences in detail. 
 
2.1 The Main Determinants of Housing Tenure Outcomes 
In the United States homeownership offers important income related tax benefits. While 
owner-occupiers can deduct mortgage interest payments from income taxes, the same is not true 
for landlords. Similarly, in contrast to landlords who have to pay taxes on rental income, 
homeowners do not have to pay taxes on imputed rents. Both types of tax benefits imply lower 
relative user costs for owner-occupied housing and consequently a greater likelihood that a 
particular housing unit is owner-occupied (Rosen 1979). Given that both types of 
homeownership-subsidies are income tax dependent, all else equal, the likelihood that a 
household becomes a homeowner should increase with income. Moreover, the positive effect of 
income on homeownership attainment is reinforced by the fact that mortgage lenders (and 
secondary mortgage market institutions that securitize the mortgages) require that the mortgage 
applicant’s annual income exceeds a certain share of the purchase price of the home. Both the 
‘income constraint’ and the ‘income tax effect’ imply that the positive impact of income on 
homeownership may be non-linear (increasing at a decreasing rate).3  
Homeownership offers other advantages as well. A homeowner can be interpreted as a 
landlord who rents to herself or himself implying that incentives of landlords and tenants are 
aligned. Hence, homeownership reduces the so called maintenance problem which arises from 
the fact that rental contracts cannot explicitly provide for all possible contingencies (Henderson 
and Ioannides 1983). Similarly, homeowners – in contrast to tenants – can capture the benefits of 
neighborhood and property improvements. Homeownership provides property rights to alter the 
home however the occupier sees fit, generating greater benefits for the user, especially over the 
long-run. Finally, homeownership provides a hedge against rent and other consumption risks 
(Ortalo-Magne and Rady 2002 and Sinai and Souleles 2005).  
Homeownership also has a number of disadvantages compared to renting. To begin with, in 
contrast to corporate and institutional investors single owner-occupiers typically cannot 
adequately diversify their housing investment risk (see for example Henderson and Ioannides 
                                                 
3
 Moreover, all else equal, households with more uncertain incomes should be less likely to own their homes. 
Haurin (1991) and Robst et al. (1999) provide evidence consistent with this proposition. 
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1983 and Bruecker 1997 for the theoretical argument and Hilber 2005 for empirical evidence 
consistent with the argument). Owner-occupiers also face much higher relocation costs compared 
to renter-occupiers. This is because of transaction costs associated with the purchase and sale of 
properties. Haurin and Gill (2002) estimate these transaction costs of selling a home for the 
United States as the sum of 3 percent of the house value and 4 percent of household earning. As a 
consequence, the expected duration in the property (which is negatively related to the annualized 
transaction cost) should be expected to determine to a significant extent whether households 
choose to own or rent. Using a unique military dataset, Haurin and Gill provide direct evidence 
that expected length of stay (of military personnel at the assigned bases) and transaction costs of 
selling a property are very important determinants of the housing tenure decision. For most 
households, however, the expected duration in the property – which is mainly determined by the 
household’s life-cycle status – is not known in advance, at least not to researchers, and needs to 
be proxied by demographic and socio-economic characteristics. In fact, numerous studies 
demonstrate that demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of households can explain to a 
large extent housing tenure decisions of households (e.g., Eilbott and Binkowski 1985 using 
aggregated data or Gyourko and Linneman 1996 using disaggregated data).  
The set of household specific control variables in empirical housing tenure choice studies 
also typically includes dummy variables for the race of the household. Household race may affect 
housing tenure outcomes for at least two reasons. Firstly, housing tenure outcomes may be 
affected by racial discrimination (Kain and Quigley 1972). Discrimination may occur at various 
stages in the process leading to homeownership including discrimination by real estate brokers or 
mortgage lenders. Yinger (1995) provides a review of such discriminatory behavior along with 
estimates of their cost. Munnell et al. (1996) provide empirical evidence on the discrimination by 
mortgage lenders.4 Secondly, different racial groups may differ, for example, in their preferences 
for homeownership or in their expected duration in a property (i.e., their mobility) and hence in 
their relative demand for homeownership.  
Summing up the above discussion, we can express the housing tenure choice of household i 
in reduced form as: 
 
( ) ( )Pr 1 , ,i i i iown f X y R= =  (1) 
 
                                                 
4
 Ladd (1998) provides a survey on this topic. 
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where ( )Pr iown  denotes the likelihood that household i owns, iX  is a vector of demographic and 
socio-economic characteristics of household i (including age and marital status but not wealth), 
iy  denotes the household income and iR  is a vector of dummy variables for the different racial 
groups. 
A number of empirical studies have estimated tenure choice equations similar to equation 
(1), mainly relying on Census micro data or data from the American Housing Survey (AHS). 
Consistently these studies find that black households are less likely to own compared to white 
households (e.g., Painter et al. 2001, Gabriel and Rosenthal 2005). One drawback of using 
Census micro data or AHS data is that these data sources only provide very crude proxy measures 
for household wealth (e.g., household income, age, dividend and interest income) and do not 
provide any information on parental characteristics. We discuss the effects of these variables on 
homeownership outcomes in turn. 
 
2.2 The Role of Household Wealth 
Household wealth may affect tenure outcomes for two reasons. Firstly, downpayment 
requirements prevent wealth constrained households from obtaining a mortgage. Secondly, 
owner-occupiers with limited wealth are more likely to be forced to overinvest in housing from 
an optimal portfolio allocation point of view, all else equal, reducing the relative demand for 
homeownership. This effect is reinforced by the fact that households with limited wealth 
typically have to highly leverage their housing investments. Both theoretical arguments imply 
that wealth may have a non-linear positive effect on homeownership propensities (increasing at a 
decreasing rate). 
A few empirical studies investigate the role of wealth for housing tenure outcomes. 
Linneman and Wachter (1989) were the first to provide direct parameterization of the impacts of 
borrowing constraints. Using the Federal Reserve Board’s 1977 Survey of Consumer Credit and 
the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) they show that both income and wealth constraints 
reduce homeownership propensities and that the impact of the latter is stronger. Moreover, their 
results imply that the impact of borrowing constraints has decreased in the early 1980s, possibly 
as a result of mortgage market innovations. In a follow-up study, using the same data as in the 
earlier study but adding data from the 1962 Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers, 
Gyourko et al. (1999) find that the racial disparities in ownership outcomes are small for 
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households that are wealth unconstrained but are substantial for wealth constrained households 
with white households owning at higher rates than equivalent minority households. Similarly, 
Duca and Rosenthal (1994), using the 1983 SCF demonstrate that borrowing constraints have a 
significant negative effect on homeownership rates. Moreover, the negative impact of borrowing 
constraints on homeownership appears to be stronger for younger and non-white families. 
 
2.3 The Role of Parental Externalities 
A few studies highlight the role of parental externalities for housing decisions. Engelhardt 
and Mayer (1994) document that about one in five first-time home buyers receives assistance 
from relatives in making the downpayment, with the average gift being roughly one-half of the 
total downpayment. These findings imply that parental gifts may be important in relaxing 
downpayment constraints and allow otherwise constrained households to purchase a home. 
Mayer and Engelhardt (1996) provide further supporting evidence. Charles and Hurst (2002), 
using data from the PSID, demonstrate that differences in income, family structure, and in the 
ability and willingness of parents to provide downpayment support are the primary reasons for 
the fact that mortgage applications of black households are almost twice as likely as those of 
comparable white households to be rejected. They also document that 27 percent of white 
households but only 7 percent of black households that purchased a home had help with their 
downpayment from their families. These findings imply that omitting parental wealth as an 
explanatory variable of the housing tenure choice potentially causes a serious omitted variable 
bias. The extent of parental support may not only be related to parental wealth but also to their 
income. Parents who still earn or have a high income from pensions may be more willing or more 
at ease to help their offspring to overcome downpayment and liquidity constraints.  
 
2.4 The Relative Supply of Owner-Occupied Properties and the Role of Location  
With a few exceptions previous housing tenure choice studies have focused on the demand 
side, that is on the housing consumers’ relative demand for owner-occupied versus renter-
occupied space. However, a focus on the demand side alone ignores that it is the property 
developers and owners of existing properties (i.e., the suppliers) who effectively determine the 
tenure status of properties. Not all property developers and owners have the same cost functions. 
Moreover, because the relative marginal cost of providing owner-occupied (versus renter-
occupied) space can differ across property types and locations, one would expect that in general 
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equilibrium, all else equal, the housing consumers’ tenure decisions are affected by their 
locational preferences and corresponding locational choices. 
In this context, Linneman (1985) points out that building types and locations differ in their 
inherent ‘relative landlord production efficiency’. Landlords (who typically own numerous units 
in a building or several buildings) have comparative production efficiency advantages in terms of 
maintaining the housing units and solving a number of free-rider problems with respect to 
common facility maintenance compared to owner-occupiers.5 These relative landlord production 
efficiency advantages tend to be much greater in highly urbanized locations with predominance 
of high-rise and low-rise buildings and close proximities between managed properties than in 
suburbanized or rural areas.6 Not surprisingly, homeownership rates are typically very high in 
rural and suburban areas but relatively low (sometimes in the single digit numbers) in highly 
urbanized places. Empirically, the housing type has been demonstrated to be a quantitatively very 
important determinant of the homeownership status of properties (see for example Hilber 2005). 
Locations differ not only in their housing stock but also in their housing investment risk. 
House prices in more urbanized places tend to be much less stable (more uncertain) than in 
suburban or rural places. In this context, Hilber (2005) argues that, all else equal, properties in 
neighborhoods with high levels of externality risks (i.e., high levels of variation in junk and litter 
in the street, in street noise, in neighborhood noise and in neighborhood crime) should be less 
likely to be owner-occupied. Empirical evidence from the AHS strongly supports this 
proposition. In fact, Hilber’s findings imply that the phenomenon of particularly low 
homeownership rates in inner cities can essentially be explained by the particularities of the 
housing stock (i.e., a large share of high- and low-rise buildings) and by high levels of various 
neighborhood externality risks.7 
Acknowledging the importance of the role of locational choices in housing tenure decisions, 
a few empirical studies have estimated multinomial logit models by either assuming that 
households simultaneously choose their location and housing tenure or by assuming a certain 
                                                 
5
 Linneman (1985) lists a number of specific reasons for why landlords are expected to have a greater production 
efficiency including superior credit ratings, greater political influence which yield lower tax assessments, 
maintenance cost efficiencies and economies associated with processing a landlord’s credit application compared to 
that of a homeowner.  
6
 Landlords can facilitate the internalization of externalities in densely located areas by reducing the bargaining 
costs associated with dealing with neighbors within and outside the structure (Linneman 1985).  
7
 Turner (2003) provides further evidence at the MSA level, suggesting that housing investment risk has a 
negative impact on homeownership propensities. 
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‘tree structure’ in the decision process. Gyourko et al. (1999) estimate a multinomial logit model 
that treats central city versus suburban location as a choice variable in addition to tenure status. 
Their findings imply that while controlling for wealth constraint status eliminates minority-white 
tenure choice differences among the unconstrained, location differences remain for this group and 
also for the group of constrained households. As Gyourko et al. (1999) point out; one limitation 
of their data set is the fact that their location information is extremely limited. They therefore 
point to the PSID as a data source that provides both detailed wealth and more detailed location 
information.  
In a similar vein, Deng et al. (2003) investigate whether racial differences in residential 
location outcomes are among the factors contributing to the large racial differences in 
homeownership rates in the Philadelphia metro area. More specifically, the empirical analysis is 
based on 1985 AHS data for the MSA of Philadelphia and considers the influence of 
neighborhood location options on homeownership endogenously based on a nested multinomial 
logit specification.8 That is, tenure choice is modeled such that the homeownership decision is 
made while considering alternative subsets of neighborhood options. Their empirical findings 
suggest that African–American residential location outcomes are associated with lower than 
expected racial differences in homeownership suggesting that after controlling for neighborhood, 
racial differences in homeownership are larger than originally assumed and endowments 
(measured by various types of household income) explain less than half of the larger 
homeownership differences.  
Finally, Dawkins (2005) uses PSID data to study the contribution of residential location 
towards the black-white gap in first time homeownership transitions, that is, the fact that black 
households wait longer to transition into first-time homeownership than white households. Using 
time duration models Dawkins finds that various residential location characteristics, particularly 
those associated with the supply of affordable owner-occupied housing, affect racial gaps in first-
time homeownership transitions. However, most of the gaps in homeownership transitions would 
be eliminated if Blacks and Whites had similar household characteristics. 
 
                                                 
8
 One limitation of using the 1985 AHS is that it does not provide direct information on the household’s own 
wealth (nor does it provide any information on the characteristics of the household’s parents). Moreover factors that 
may contribute to the black-white homeownership gap may have changed since the mid 1980s.  
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2.5 Specification of Empirical Model 
As outlined above, the relative demand for owner-occupied (compared to renter-occupied) 
space may be mainly determined by demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the 
housing consumers (including household income and wealth) and their parents (via parental 
externalities). Additionally, the relative demand may be affected by location-specific differences 
in the level of housing investment risk (highly urbanized places tend to more risky than suburban 
or rural locations). The relative supply of homeownership on the other hand may be mainly 
determined by location specific differences in relative landlord production efficiency advantages 
(that is, the provision of housing by landlords can be expected to be more cost-efficient in highly 
urbanized locations with predominance of high-rise and low-rise buildings and close proximities 
between managed properties).  
In reduced form we can express the equilibrium probability that household i in location j 
owns as: 
 
( ) ( )*Pr 1 , , , , , ,P Pij i i i i i i jown f X R y w y w u= =  (2) 
 
where iw , 
P
iy , 
P
iw  and ju  denote the wealth of household i, the income and wealth situation of 
household i’s parents and the degree of urbanization in location j. The latter variable is expected 
to capture location-specific differences in the relative landlord production efficiency and in the 
level of housing investment risks.9  
From the housing consumer’s point of view, the above considerations imply that the 
household’s locational preferences and the corresponding (revealed) macro-location choice (i.e., 
living in a highly urbanized environment versus living in a smaller city or a rural area) affect the 
relative user cost of homeownership and hence the housing tenure decision. In other words, 
equation (2) assumes that the macro-location choice is exogenous to the housing tenure choice. 
We deem this to be a reasonable assumption. This is not to say that location choices are per se 
exogenous to housing tenure decisions. Rather, similar to Deng et al. (2003) we conjecture that 
micro-location (neighborhood) choices and tenure choices may be simultaneously determined. 
However, we maintain that households typically choose their macro-location because of 
                                                 
9
 In the empirical analysis below we distinguish between six macro-location types that differ in their degree of 
urbanization: type 1: ‘size of largest city in county of residence is 500,000 or more’; type 2: ‘size is 100,000 to 
499,999’; type 3: ‘size is 50,000 to 99,999’; type 4: ‘size is 25,000 to 49,999’; type 5: ‘size is 10,000 to 24,999’; type 
6: ‘size is under 10,000’. Unfortunately the PSID does not provide any information on the housing type – an 
alternative and perhaps better proxy measure for the relative landlord production efficiency – of the panelists’ homes. 
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employment related reasons (i.e., farmers choose to live in rural areas while high-tech specialists 
or hedge fund managers typically choose to live in highly urbanized locations such as the Bay 
Area or the New York metro area) independent of their housing tenure choice. Similarly, it seems 
reasonable to assume that elderly households make their macro-location choices based on their 
preferences for certain lifestyles (i.e., living in the mountains or in dry desert-like climate versus 
living in a large city) and not conditional on their tenure choice. Nevertheless, acknowledging the 
possibility that households may simultaneously choose the housing tenure and macro-location 
and acknowledging the possibility of “sorting on unobservables”, we also report results of a 
multinomial logistic model that assumes that households have a choice between twelve different 
housing tenure-location options (owning vs. renting in six macro-location types). See Section 4.4 
below. 
We can illustrate the above considerations graphically if we assume that households differ in 
their (unobserved) idiosyncratic preferences for homeownership and suppliers of housing in their 
(unobserved) idiosyncratic relative landlord production efficiency. Figure 1 depicts the 
aggregated demand for and supply of owner-occupied relative to renter-occupied housing. Given 
the particular nature of the ‘good’ homeownership, the ‘quantity’ of the good is expressed as the 
fraction of local housing units that are owner-occupied (i.e., the homeownership rate). The ‘price’ 
is the (unobserved) price premium of homeownership compared to renting, Op∆ . (The price 
premium Op∆  can be positive or negative.) An increasing price premium Op∆  increases the share 
of property owners that self-occupy (or sell to buyers who self-occupy) (i.e., positive slope of the 
supply curve) and decreases the share of housing consumers that choose homeownership over 
renting (negative slope of the demand curve). The equilibrium homeownership rate is determined 
by the interaction of relative demand and supply. 
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Figure 1: Relative Demand for and Supply of Homeownership 
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Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium outcomes for two different stylized settings. Consider first 
the relative demand and supply curves that interact at point W. This setting depicts a less 
urbanized area with single detached housing (lower differential marginal cost of homeownership) 
and wealthier local residents (strong relative demand for homeownership). In our data sample this 
corresponds quite well to the group of white households. The second setting depicts the demand 
and supply curves of a more urbanized location with low-rise and high-rise buildings that consists 
of less wealthy households (weaker demand for and less supply of owner-occupied housing). 
This setting corresponds better to the group of black households. The equilibrium 
homeownership rate in the less wealthy urbanized location (point B) is much lower than that in 
the wealthier suburban location (point W).  
Overall, the above considerations suggest that the homeownership status of properties (and 
the corresponding housing tenure of households) is to a large extent determined by location 
specific factors. Because black and white households may differ in their preferences for certain 
location types (or are forced to live in certain location types due to constraints) it is imperative 
that we control for location. We outline our empirical specification and, in particular, how we 
control for locational choices in Section 4 below. Next we describe the data used in the empirical 
analysis. 
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3 Description of Data 
Our intergenerational data is derived from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a 
nationally representative longitudinal survey of about 5,000 families that the University of 
Michigan’s Survey Research Center has conducted annually since 1968. The PSID is a large 
scale survey and is an ideal dataset for exploring connections between generations.  It contains 
extensive economic and socio-demographic information about families and their relatives. 
Among other information, the survey asks the households about their race, age, marital status, 
number of children, educational attainment as well as about their earned labor and asset income, 
transfer payments received, a variety of housing information (including whether the home is 
owner-occupied or renter-occupied) and the macro-location type, that is, the size of the largest 
city in the county of residence (a measure for the degree of urbanization or relative landlord 
production efficiency, respectively).  
Because the PSID is a longitudinal survey that has followed families and their offspring 
since 1968, it contains household social and economic information over different stages of their 
lives. This enables us to obtain information about two generations of a given family in the same 
dataset including the current income and total net wealth of the household head’s parents.10 It 
should be noted in this context that parents and their children are separate records in the PSID; 
the same information is available for both parents and children as they are considered to be 
different households. 
One important advantage of using PSID data, for the purpose of our study, is the fact that 
household wealth is calculated precisely (based on survey information) and is conceptually 
neutral as to whether a household owns or rents. Specifically, our measure of wealth is the total 
net wealth including all relevant assets net of liabilities.11 In terms of home equity, estimates of 
the value of property assets are included on the asset side, while the remaining mortgage 
principal is deducted. So if a household purchases a house with a downpayment of $50,000, this 
is equivalent to still having the $50,000 on the bank account, in terms of our measure of total net 
                                                 
10
 See Chiteji and Stafford (2003) for more discussion about how to construct an intergenerational data set using 
the PSID.  
11
 In 2001 (as well as in 1984, 1989, 1994 and 1999) the PSID asked households extensive questions about their 
wealth. For the measure of wealth, the household’s holdings include real estate (first home, second home, rental real 
estate, land contract holdings etc.), cars, trucks, motor homes, boats, farm business, stocks, bonds, mutual funds, 
saving and checking accounts, money market funds, certificate of deposit, government saving bonds, Treasury bills, 
IRAs, bond funds, cash values of life insurance policies, valuable collections for investment purposes, and rights in a 
trust or estate. Deducted from all these holdings are outstanding mortgage principal, debt on credit cards, and other 
debt on the above listed assets. For details see: Juster et al. (1999). 
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wealth. Of course, to the extent that (leveraged) home equity is a better (or worse) investment 
compared to alternative investments, owning or renting affects the future wealth situation of a 
household.12 Moreover, even if owning and renting an identical property itself is wealth-neutral, 
homeownership provides a mechanism for ‘automated’ or ‘forced’ savings since borrowers 
typically pay back a small share of the principal with each mortgage payment, potentially 
increasing household wealth of homeowners relative to renters in the long-run. Another reason 
why one might be concerned about the endogeneity of household wealth is due to the possibility 
that (unobserved) omitted variables determine both wealth and the propensity to own a house, 
causing a bias and leading to inconsistent estimates. Our empirical specifications control for 
numerous demographic and socio-economic characteristics. Table 4 lists the full set of controls 
(along with the omitted categories), which include information on household income and wealth, 
standard demographic variables, education level, employment status, occupation type (as proxy 
for permanent income), the number of years since the (young) household first formed the own 
household and parental income and wealth. This broad list of controls may somewhat alleviate 
the concern of omitted variable bias.13 Nevertheless, in order to fully address all potential 
endogeneity and related omitted variable issues, we instrument for household wealth in our 
empirical analysis below. The identification strategy is described in Section 4.3 and 
corresponding results are summarized in the same section. 
Our regression sample consists of households with household heads who are at least 25 years 
old by 2000. We put an age restriction on our sample because we want individuals who are 
mature enough for homeownership to be a reasonable option for them. We exclude the few 
households in the PSID intergenerational sample that are non-White and non-Black as our focus 
is on the black-white homeownership gap. This exclusion reduces the regression sample size 
from 1015 to 983 observations, consisting of 298 black households and 685 white households. 
A first look at the PSID longitudinal data provides some interesting insights that are 
consistent with our propositions that household wealth and locational preferences (and the 
corresponding relative cost of homeownership) may be important factors in explaining the black-
white homeownership gap. Consistent with the hypothesis that the widening black-white 
                                                 
12
 It is not per se clear however, whether home equity is a better or worse investment than say stocks. If financial 
markets are perfect then risk-adjusted returns should be similar across investment categories. 
13
 For example, one might be worried that education levels determine both wealth and the propensity to own 
(because of the institutional understanding gained through schooling). However, education levels are one of our 
many controls in the empirical analysis below. 
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homeownership gap (see Table 1) may be partly the result of differences in household wealth, 
Table 2 reveals that the black-white total wealth gap has indeed been increasing between 1984 
and 2001, both in nominal and real terms. Similarly, consistent with the proposition that the 
widening homeownership gap may be partly explained by differences in macro-locational 
choices, Table 3 reveals that black households are significantly more likely than white 
households to live in a county where the size of the largest city exceeds 50,000 residents. While 
the suburbanization trend is observable for both racial groups, the gap in locational choices has 
been increasing consistently between 1985 and 2001. Finally, consistent with the hypothesis that 
differences in parental wealth may partially explain the black-white homeownership gap, Table 4 
(which summarizes statistics for our base regression sample for 2001, separately for the group of 
black households and white households) reveals that the parental wealth gap between black and 
white households is very substantial.14 The table also reveals that black households in our 
regression sample have much lower levels of homeownership attainment (36 percent versus 65 
percent), lower labor income, lower levels of educational attainment and lower marriage rates. 
However, on average, black households in our sample have more children. 
A final note concerns the interpretation of our intergenerational data (i.e., our focus on 
children of households from a nationally representative sample) and the corresponding empirical 
analysis. If we would run our analysis using the full sample of the PSID, our results would 
basically be cross-sectional in nature. However, since we use a subsample of children of PSID 
households who formed their own household, our analysis essentially becomes a transitional 
one.15 Similar to Dawkins (2005) we are asking among newly formed households what is the 
likelihood that they will have transitioned into homeownership given their family background 
and given events that have occurred in their life such as educational attainment or labor market 
success.16 One implication of the interpretation of our study as a transitional analysis is the 
importance to control for the time since a household head first formed an own household. In our 
empirical analysis below we therefore include the ‘number of years since a household head first 
formed an own household’ as an additional control variable. In fact, in our empirical analysis 
                                                 
14
 The PSID does not allow us to compute this information over a longer-period of time as parental information 
only becomes available during the later years of the PSID. 
15
 We are thankful to Stephen L. Ross for pointing out this interpretation to us. 
16
 Our focus on households, who have relatively recently transitioned into homeownership also somewhat 
alleviates reversed causality concerns related to the above described phenomenon that ‘forced savings’ through 
homeownership affect household wealth in the long-run. 
 15 
below the control is statistically insignificant in all specifications when household age is 
controlled for (not inconsistent with the main findings in Dawkins, 2005).17  
 
4 Empirical Analysis 
In the empirical analysis that follows we assess to what extent the traditionally ‘unexplained’ 
black-white homeownership gap may be explained by differences in household wealth, parental 
externalities and locational preferences. We first outline our model specification, the estimation 
method and the empirical strategy. Next, we report our main results. In a third step we propose an 
identification strategy for the wealth variables and summarize the results of the corresponding 
instrumental variable estimates. Finally, we discuss an alternative multinomial-model 
specification and present results. 
 
4.1 Estimation Method and Empirical Strategy 
We estimate the probability that a household owns its residence using a standard binary 
maximum-likelihood logit model as described in equation (3): 
 
( ) ( )1Pr 1 1 ijij Zown e β= = +  (3) 
 
where ( )Pr 1ijown =  is the probability that household i in location j owns its housing unit, Zij is a 
vector of explanatory variables and β  is the corresponding vector of logistic regression 
coefficients. 
Our empirical strategy is as follows. We start by estimating a traditional tenure choice model 
as outlined in equation (1) whereas ( ), ,i i i ijX y R Z∈ . This specification omits a number of 
variables that can be expected to determine a household’s housing tenure choice; the household’s 
own wealth, parental externalities and locational preferences. As discussed above, in our sample, 
black households, on average, are much less wealthy and live in more urbanized locations 
compared to white households. Similarly, the parents of black households are, on average, less 
wealthy and have lower incomes compared to parents of white households. Hence, we expect the 
                                                 
17
 If we drop the age category dummies then the ‘household formation’-variable becomes statistically significant.. 
The results with respect to our variables of interest (‘household head is black’ variable and wealth variables) remain 
virtually unchanged if we exclude the control. However, in order to be consistent with the interpretation of our study 
as a transitional one, we keep the control. 
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addition of these variables to reduce the ‘unexplained’ black-white homeownership gap. Below, 
we investigate the impact of each of the variables on homeownership propensities and test 
whether the black-white gap still persists when we jointly control for the additional variables.  
More specifically, we proceed as follows. In a first step we add the household’s own wealth 
iw  as an explanatory variable, both in a linear and non-linear way. Next, we test the additional 
impact of parental externalities. These externalities include the effects of parental wealth and 
parental income. In a subsequent step we estimate the additional impact of differences in the 
households’ locational preferences and the corresponding locational differences in the relative 
cost of providing homeownership. The final specification corresponds to the reduced form 
equation (2). We summarize the results of our various binary logit estimates in Section 4.2. 
Detailed results are reported in Tables 5 to 7. In Section 4.3 we address endogeneity concerns 
related to the household’s own wealth and parental wealth. We first describe the identification 
strategy. Next we summarize the results that are reported in detail in Table 8. Quantitative effects 
for all specifications are documented in Table 9. Finally, we perform a sensitivity analysis to test 
to what extent our results may be affected by our assumption that the macro-location choice is 
exogenous to the housing tenure decision. Specifically, we estimate a multinomial logistic model 
that assumes that households can simultaneously choose the housing tenure and macro-location 
type. The methodology and results are summarized in Section 4.4. Detailed results are reported in 
Tables 10 and 11.  
 
4.2 Results of Binary Logit Estimates 
Our base specification is a traditional tenure choice equation as outlined in equation (1). The 
results, which are reported in column (1) of Table 5, essentially confirm the findings of previous 
tenure choice studies. In particular, the coefficient of the dummy variable for black households, 
which measures the ‘unexplained’ black-white homeownership gap, is negative and highly 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficient implies that controlling for 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics (excluding wealth), a black household’s 
probability of owning is 6.5 percentage points lower than that of a white household (see Table 9 
for details on how this quantitative effect is calculated). This ‘unexplained’ black-white 
homeownership gap is similar in magnitude to ‘unexplained’ gaps identified in earlier studies. 
For example, Gabriel and Rosenthal (2005), using the SCF, estimate a gap of about 8 percentage 
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points, also for 2001. The coefficients on the demographic and socio-economic controls (income, 
employment status, age, marital status, children, education and occupation type) have the 
expected signs and – with a few exceptions – are statistically significant at least at the 5 percent 
level. See Table 5 for details.  
Column (2) of Table 5 reports results for a specification that includes the household’s own 
wealth iw  as an explanatory variable. As expected, an increase in household wealth increases the 
probability of homeownership. The effect is not only statistically significant (at the 5 percent 
level) but also quantitatively important. An increase of household wealth by 10 percent 
(measured at the sample mean) increases the likelihood of homeownership by 3.1 percent. As 
expected, controlling for total household wealth reduces the ‘unexplained’ black-white 
homeownership gap substantially to just 2.2 percentage points (that is, household wealth explains 
almost two third of the ‘unexplained’ gap). However, the dummy variable for black households 
in the sample is still highly statistically significant with a p-value of 0.03.  
Column (3) of Table 5 captures total household wealth in a non-linear way by including two 
category dummy variables (between $10,000 and $50,000 and above $50,000; below $10,000 is 
the omitted category) as explanatory variables.18 As expected, households with wealth above 
$50,000 are significantly more likely to own (all else equal) than households with wealth 
between $10,000 and $50000. The latter category in turn is significantly more likely to own than 
households with wealth below $10,000. Both category dummy variables are statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. The estimated coefficients imply that an increase in own wealth 
from below $10,000 to above $50,000 increases the likelihood of homeownership by 31 
percentage points. The coefficient on the dummy variable for black households still has a 
negative sign but is now no longer statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The implied 
black-white homeownership gap is 1.9 percentage points. The fact that the pseudo R2 increases 
from 0.35 (column 2) to 0.44 (column 3) and that the percentage of correct predictions increases 
from about 81 to 83 percent suggests that the latter specification is a better fit and that one ought 
to control for wealth non-linearly. Overall the results suggest that household wealth is a very 
important determinant of housing tenure outcomes and omitting it may cause a serious omitted 
                                                 
18
 We use category dummies to capture the non-linear effect of wealth rather than interaction effects. Ai and 
Norton (2003) demonstrate that interaction effects in nonlinear models such as logit models do not equal the 
marginal effect of the interaction term, can be of opposite sign and its statistical significance is not calculated by 
standard software. Programs are available (in STATA) that can be used to compute correct interaction effects but 
only for exactly two variables and no squared or other non-linear terms. 
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variable bias. It should also be noted that results are very similar if the specification reported in 
column (3) of Table 5 is replicated for the full set of households in the PSID. Results are reported 
in Appendix Table A1, first for the full sample, then for the samples of black households and 
white households separately. Similar to the results reported in column (3) of Table 5, the 
coefficient on the ‘household head is black’ variable is statistically insignificant and 
quantitatively not meaningful.19 This result implies that our estimates for the intergenerational 
dataset may be representative for the entire population. 
Table 6 tests to what extent parental externalities explain the remaining black-white 
homeownership gap. Column (1) of Table 6 differs from column (3) of Table 5 only in that we 
additionally control for parental wealth Piw , again, using the same category dummy variables as 
for the children. Consistent with Engelhardt and Mayer (1994), Mayer and Engelhardt (1996) and 
Charles and Hurst (2002) who demonstrate that parental gifts are important in relaxing 
downpayment constraints, we find that having wealthier parents increases the likelihood that 
households own their homes. Our parameter estimates imply that the only thing that matters is 
that the parents have accumulated some wealth (above $10,000), somewhat surprisingly, whether 
parents have wealth between $10,000 and $50,000 or more than $50,000 has no distinguishable 
effect on the offspring’s homeownership propensity, although the latter effect is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level, while the former effect is only significant at the 5 percent level. 
Importantly, when we control for parental wealth, the dummy variable for being Black remains 
statistically insignificant and the implied black-white homeownership gap is further reduced, 
although, in a quantitative sense, the gap remains marginally meaningful with 1.5 percentage 
points. Colum (2) of Table 6 additionally adds the parents’ household income Piy  as a control, 
again as category dummies. The coefficients on the two category dummy variables are 
insignificant in a statistical sense implying that parental income – in contrast to parental wealth – 
does not matter for the offspring’s housing tenure choice. The parameter estimates of the dummy 
variable for black households and the category dummy variables for parental wealth remain 
virtually unchanged. 
                                                 
19
 We also estimated the specification reported in column (1) of Appendix Table A1 separately for each macro-
location type. Our variable of interest (‘household head is black’) is completely statistically insignificant in all but 
one case (‘locations where the population size of the largest city in the county of residence is 50,000-99,999’). 
Results are available from the authors upon request. 
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Finally, in Table 7 we additionally control for a household’s revealed macro-location choice 
assuming that the household chooses the macro-location prior to/independently of the housing 
tenure decision, that is, assuming that the macro-location is an exogenous explanatory variable of 
the housing tenure decision. (In Section 4.4 below we test whether our results hold if we assume 
that households choose housing tenure-macro-location combinations, that is, make simultaneous 
housing tenure and macro location choices.)  
First we report results for our favorite empirical specification in column (1) of Table 7. The 
specification is identical to equation (2) except that we drop the parents’ income as our previous 
results suggest that this variable has no independent impact on the panelists’ homeownership 
outcomes. We control for the macro-location choice by using dummy variables for the various 
macro-location types provided by the PSID. We omit the ‘least urban’ macro-location type – 
counties of residence that do not contain a city with more than 10,000 inhabitants – from our 
regression. Households in these places, all else equal, should be most likely to own their home. 
Hence, we predict that the coefficients on the remaining macro-location type dummies have a 
negative sign and that the absolute values of the coefficients increase in magnitude with greater 
degree of urbanization. We indeed find that all else equal households are least likely to own in 
the most urbanized macro-location type (counties of residence that contain at least one city with 
500,000 or more inhabitants), followed by the second most urbanized macro-location type. Both 
effects are statistically highly significant (at the 1 percent level). The effects of the remaining 
three included macro-location types are insignificant in statistical terms. The finding implies a 
non-linear negative effect of the degree of urbanization on homeownership outcomes; relative 
landlord production efficiency advantages and housing investment risks seem to matter most in 
highly urbanized settings. Our variable of interest ‘household head is black’ remains insignificant 
in a statistical sense. Moreover the variable becomes virtually meaningless in a quantitative sense 
as well. In fact, the coefficient on the ‘household head is black’ variable changes the sign, 
implying that, all else equal (controlling for own and parental wealth and macro-location type), 
black households have a 0.6 percentage point higher probability of owning their home than white 
households. 
Next, we report results separately for the group of black households (column 2) and white 
households (column 3). This sample split allows us to assess whether the explanatory variables 
have a differential impact for the two groups. Note that the estimated specification differs from 
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that reported in column (1) only in that the dummy variable ‘household head is black’ is dropped. 
Note also that the sample sizes of the two groups are quite different (298 black households versus 
685 white households). Hence, statistical significance levels are not directly comparable. 
Generally, the estimated parameter values are quite different for the two groups. For example, the 
household’s own income and wealth and the parent’s wealth appear to be more important in 
determining homeownership outcomes for the group of black households. These findings are 
consistent with Wachter and Megbolugbe (1992) and Gyourko et al. (1999) who also find that 
African-American homeownership rates are significantly more responsive to changes in income 
and wealth. Moreover, the findings are consistent with Charles and Hurst (2002) who find that 
white households are much more likely to receive help with their downpayment from their 
families. However, it should be noted that the null hypothesis of equality of the corresponding 
parameter estimates for the two groups can only be rejected with 90 percent confidence in one 
case (‘household income is more than $75,000’). The degree of urbanization has a stronger 
impact on homeownership propensities for black households. Table 9 reveals that the move from 
a ‘rural’ location to a ‘highly urbanized’ location reduces the likelihood of homeownership of a 
black household by 13.7 percentage points but that of a white household only by 2.8 percentage 
points. The hypothesis of joint equality of the macro-location type dummies between the two 
groups can be rejected with 95 percent confidence. This result is consistent with the view that 
more liquidity and downpayment constrained black households react more sensitively to relative 
user cost differences between owner-occupied and rental housing. It is however also consistent 
with the view that redlining by lenders in predominately black inner city neighborhoods prevents 
black households from attaining homeownership.  
 
4.3 Endogeneity of Wealth, Identification Strategy and Results of TSLS-Estimates  
The results reported in the previous section are based on the assumption that household 
wealth and parental wealth are truly exogenous determinants of a household’s tenure choice. As 
discussed in Section 3, our measure of total net household wealth (of children or parents) is 
supposedly neutral to whether a household owns or rents in the sense that the current value of the 
home is added to our measure of wealth while the remaining mortgage principal is deducted. 
Nevertheless, as discussed in Section 3, the exogeneity assumption is questionable.  
In order to address the endogeneity concerns we apply an instrumental variable technique 
that allows us to identify the exogenous portion of household (own) and parental total net wealth. 
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The identification strategy exploits the fact that the saving propensity of children (and hence their 
wealth situation) is to a significant extent determined by mimicking their parents’ behavior. For 
example, Chiteji and Stafford (1999) demonstrate that the parents’ portfolio choices are effective 
predictors of the portfolio choices of the children. Parents who held stocks when younger are 
more likely to go on to have children who go on to hold stocks as young adults. In a similar vein, 
Charles and Hurst (2003) estimate the age-adjusted elasticity of child wealth with respect to 
parental wealth before the transfer of bequests. While finding a significant level of 
intergenerational fluidity, they also find strong evidence that parents do pass on human capital 
and saving propensities to their children. As instruments we use predetermined characteristics of 
the parents which affect the parents’ saving propensity and – through the intergenerational link – 
are expected to be correlated with the saving propensity of the children. At the same time, the 
predetermined parental characteristics act on the housing tenure choice of the children only 
through the predicted wealth variable and can be expected to be unrelated to the disturbance term. 
Specifically, our list of instrumental variables includes the occupation of the parents (or more 
precisely: the household head of the parents) when young (measured in 1976), the parents’ 
education level, parental (in)stability measured by a dummy variable for whether the parents live 
in a different state than when young, and 25 year-lagged parental income (measured in 1976).20 
One might be concerned to use parental income as an instrumental variable to identify current 
wealth, even when using a 25 year lag (arguably income shocks could be persistent two and a 
half decades later). Hence, we report results for two different specifications; with past parental 
income as instrument (‘broad’ set of instruments) and without (‘narrow’ set of instruments). We 
apply our identification strategy using a standard TSLS-estimator.21  
We report results of the TSLS-estimates in Table 8. However, we begin by reporting results 
for the corresponding OLS-estimate in column (1). The estimated specification is identical to that 
reported in column (1) of Table 7 (our preferred specification) with one exception: we use log-
transformed measures of wealth instead of a set of dummy variables for different wealth 
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 That is we measure parental income at a point in time when all offspring (i.e., the households in our transitional 
sample) are still living with their parents (i.e., have not formed an own household yet). 
21
 We also estimated an IV-probit model (with endogenous regressors) using Newey’s two-step estimator. (The 
standard conditional maximum-likelihood estimator does not lead to convergence.) Results are qualitatively very 
similar to the ones reported for the TSLS-estimator. Specifically, a household’s own wealth has a statistically 
significant causal positive effect on the likelihood of homeownership, while the causal effect of parental wealth is 
statistically insignificant. The coefficient on our key variable of interest ‘household head is black’ is also statistically 
insignificant. Results are available from the authors upon request. 
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categories. Using log-transformed measures of our two wealth variables (i.e., own wealth and 
parental wealth) captures the idea that wealth has a non-linear positive effect on the probability of 
homeownership (increasing at a decreasing rate), at the same time, using the log transformed 
variable instead of several category dummies reduces the number of endogenous regressors that 
need to be separately identified. The results are qualitatively very similar to those reported in 
column (1) of Table 7, namely, our variable of interest ‘household head is black’ is statistically 
insignificant and the implied black-white homeownership gap is less than 1 percentage point. 
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 8 report results of the TSLS-estimates using the ‘broad’ and the 
‘narrow’ sets of instruments. Overall, the results for both columns are similar and consistent both 
with the OLS estimate (column 1) and the logit estimates reported in the previous tables. 
Specifically, the coefficient on the variable of interest ‘household head is black’ is statistically 
insignificant in both columns and the implied homeownership gap is negligible in both cases 
(0.02 percentage points and 0.4 percentage points respectively). The other two variables of 
interest are our two instrumented wealth variables (a household’s own wealth and parental 
wealth). In both specifications (columns 2 and 3), the coefficient on the household’s own wealth 
variable is highly statistically significant, consistent with all other specifications reported earlier. 
Moreover, the size of the coefficient increases compared to the OLS-estimate. The implied 
quantitative (causal) effects are quite large. The effect of a change in own wealth from $10,000 to 
$50,000 increases the likelihood of homeownership by 10.6 percentage points and 10.5 
percentage points respectively, compared to 6.7 percentage points based on the OLS-estimate.22 
In contrast to the household’s own wealth, the coefficient on the (instrumented) parental wealth 
variable is not statistically significant in either of the two specifications, suggesting that parental 
wealth may not have a causal effect on the homeownership status of the children. Finally, the 
TSLS-estimates reported in columns (2) and (3) of Table 8 do not only suggest that the causal 
effect of a household’s own wealth on the probability of homeownership may be greater than 
suggested by OLS-estimates, they also imply that household income has no independent effect on 
homeownership, when the endogeneity of wealth is accounted for.  
The final four columns (4) to (7) of Table 8 report results for the specifications with the 
broad and the narrow set of instruments separately for the group of black households and the 
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 Note that the relevant quantitative effects for ‘changes in wealth’ reported for Tables 5 to 7 are not directly 
comparable with those reported for Table 8. The quantitative effects are for a change in own wealth from below 
$10,000 to above $50,000 in the former case and from (precisely) $10,000 to (precisely) $50,000 in the latter case. 
 23 
group of white households. Interestingly, while the positive effect of the household’s own wealth 
on homeownership is statistically significant in all cases, the coefficients are now somewhat 
larger for white households than for black households. This is in contrast to the findings reported 
in columns (2) and (3) of Table 7 where wealth was assumed to be exogenous. However, it 
should be noted that exactly like for Table 7, the hypothesis of equality of the corresponding 
parameter estimates of the wealth variables for the two groups cannot be rejected with 90 percent 
confidence in any case. The results reported in columns (4) to (7) further imply that parental 
wealth has no statistically significant causal effect on the housing tenure choice of the children 
independent of whether the group of black or white households is considered. When estimating 
the TSLS-specifications separately for the two groups, among the income variables only the 
coefficient on the variable ‘household income is more than 75,000’ is statistically significant (at 
the 1 percent level) but only for the group of black households. Tests of the hypothesis of 
equality of the parameter estimates of this variable can be rejected with 90 percent confidence in 
the specification with the ‘broad’ set of instruments but not in the specification with the ‘narrow’ 
set of instruments (84 percent confidence). Finally, Table 8 also reports Hansen J-statistics, 
which provide a test of overidentifying restrictions for the TSLS-estimates. The joint null 
hypothesis that the instruments are valid instruments (i.e., uncorrelated with the error term; 
excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimating equation) cannot be rejected in 
any of the specifications at any reasonable level of confidence. 
 
4.4 Results of Multinomial Logit Estimates 
In the empirical analysis above we assume that households choose their macro-location 
independent of their housing tenure. However, it is conceivable that macro-location types and the 
housing tenure are simultaneously determined. To address this concern we also estimate a 
multinomial logit model, which parameterizes a choice between 12 outcome categories (rent in 
macro-location type 1; own in macro-location type 1; … ; rent in macro-location type 6; own in 
macro-location type 6): 
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 For a definition of the six macro-location types see the notes in Table 10.  
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The subscript j runs from 1 to 12, corresponding to the 12 outcome categories. Zi is a vector of 
explanatory variables and jβ  are the corresponding sets of coefficients, corresponding to each 
outcome category j.  
Table 10 reports the estimated coefficients of the multinomial logit model for our variable of 
interest ‘household head is black’ transformed to ‘relative risk ratios’ jeβ  and corresponding 
(transformed) robust standard errors.24 We also report test statistics of the null-hypothesis that the 
relative risk ratios are equal for the two tenure choices within each macro-location type category. 
The hypothesis of equality cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level in any of the cases, implying 
that the ‘household head is black’ variable may not have a statistically significant differential 
impact on own/rent outcomes within each macro-location type (all else equal).  
We subsequently use the relative risk ratios from Table 10 to compute implied 
homeownership rates for the two groups of black and white households (in each of the six macro-
location categories). Table 11 reports these implied homeownership rates (in addition to the 
actual homeownership rates). We estimate the implied homeownership rates using the ‘method 
of recycled predictions’. That is we first pretend that all households in our sample are black but 
hold their other characteristics constant. We then calculate the probability of each of the twelve 
outcomes. Next we pretend that all households in our sample are white, still holding all other 
characteristics constant. Again, we calculate the probability of each outcome. Finally, we 
compute the implied homeownership rates as the weighted average homeownership rate in each 
location type category. The black-white differences in the implied homeownership rates – also 
reported in Table 11 – are the differences due to race, holding all other characteristics constant. 
Table 11 reveals that similar to our binary logit estimates, the black-white homeownership gap 
decreases substantially, from 29 percentage points (actual gap) to just 2 percentage points 
(implied gap with all controls). Moreover, the implied homeownership rate for black households 
exceeds that for white households in three of the six categories. Overall, these results tentatively 
confirm our earlier findings that the black-white homeownership gap becomes more or less 
insignificant – both in a statistical and quantitative sense – when own and parental wealth and 
locational choices are accounted for. Stated differently, the suburbanization trend which is more 
pronounced for the group of white households and the (growing) black-white wealth gap appear 
                                                 
24
 No constraints were imposed. That is, coefficients are not constrained in any way and can vary across macro 
locations. 
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to explain to a large extent the (growing) black-white homeownership gap that cannot be 
explained by traditional variables. 
 
5 Conclusions 
In this paper we use the PSID intergenerational data in an attempt to explain the large and 
widening black-white gap in homeownership attainment. We first estimate a ‘traditional’ housing 
tenure choice model, which predicts an ‘unexplained’ black-white homeownership gap of 6.5 
percent (similar to that identified in other recent housing tenure choice studies). When we jointly 
control for differences in own and parental wealth and in macro-location choices, the gap 
disappears entirely: it becomes insignificant in a statistical and quantitative sense.  
Our findings imply that black-white differences in homeownership attainment can be 
explained by differences in demographic and socioeconomic household characteristics (including 
wealth), by differences in the wealth situation of the households’ parents and by differences in 
locational choices. The black-white homeownership gap is neither the result of black-white 
differences in preferences for homeownership nor the consequence of discrimination purely 
based on race (i.e., independent of their income or wealth situation). However, consistent with 
previous research, our results also tentatively suggest that the various explanatory variables 
differentially impact the housing tenure outcomes of black and white households. In particular, 
our findings imply that macro-location types differentially impact homeownership propensities of 
black and white households. The fact that housing tenure outcomes of African Americans are 
much more location sensitive compared to those of Whites may be due to the fact that African 
Americans are, on average, much less wealthy and are therefore less able to diversify the inherent 
housing investment risk that tends to be highest in inner city locations. Future research may be 
able to disentangle whether the observed black-white ‘differences in the responsiveness to 
changes in income and wealth’ are the result of rational choices (i.e., different sensitivities and 
preferences between the two groups) or whether low income and low wealth form greater 
obstacles towards attaining homeownership for the group of black households, possibly as a 
result of discrimination on mortgage markets (in the process of qualifying for a mortgage or as 
the result of redlining by mortgage lenders in predominately black inner city locations). 
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Summary Statistics and Regression Tables 
 
TABLE 1 
The Black-White Homeownership Gap in the United States 
 
 Variable: Homeownership rate in % 
 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Total 64.3 64.1 64.7 67.2 68.9 
Black 44.4 42.6 42.2 47.6 48.8 
White 69.0 69.4 70.8 73.6 75.8 
Gap 24.6 26.8 28.6 26.0 27.1 
Source: Current Population Survey (Bureau of the Census). 
     
 
 
TABLE 2 
The Black-White Wealth Gap 
 
 
Variable: 
Median total household net wealth in U.S. dollar (nominal) 
 1984 1989 1994 1999 2001 
Black 2000 4200 6950 8075 10000 
White 46000 57000 78000 87000 96000 
Nominal Gap  44000 52800 71050 78925 86000 
Real Gap (base period: 1982-84) 42348 42581 47942 47374 48560 
Source: 1984-2001 PSID, using 2001 weights, all years with available data. Real values are based on 
CPI with base period 1982-1984=100 (based on U.S. city average and all items). 
 
 
TABLE 3 
Black-White Differences in Macro-Location Choice 
 
 Variable: Share of U.S. households living in a county where the size of the largest city 
equals or exceeds 50,000 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1999 2001 
Black 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.82 0.81 0.74 0.71 
White 0.78 0.77 0.76 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.71 0.69 0.67 0.54 0.49 
Gap 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.21 0.22 
Source: 1985-2001 PSID, using 2001 weights, all years with available data. 
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TABLE 4 
Variable List and Summary Statistics for Base Regression Sample 
   
 Blacks (N=298)  Whites (N=685) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
Observed Housing Tenure (in 2001)      
Household is owner-occupier  0.36  0.48   .65  0.48 
      
Household Specific Information (in 2001)      
Age of household head is  between 24 and 29 (omitted category)  0.16  0.37   0.24  0.43 
  between 30 and 34   0.21  0.41   0.24  0.43 
  between 35 and 39  0.26  0.44   0.22  0.41 
  between 40 and 44  0.26  0.44   0.20  0.40 
  45 or older  0.12  0.33   0.096  0.30 
Household head has children (no children = omitted category)  0.62  0.49   0.52  0.50 
Number of children  1.33  1.35   0.98  1.14 
Household head has one child  0.19  0.40   0.19  0.40 
  two children  0.26  0.44   0.21  0.41 
  more than two children  0.17  0.38   0.12  0.32 
Household income   31505  28566   72244  78873 
 Median  24980    54850  
Household has no income (omitted category)  0.11  0.31   0.012  0.11 
Household has income  but less than 35,000 (omitted category)  0.53  0.50   0.28  0.45 
  between $35,000 and 74,999  0.28  0.45   .39  0.49 
  75,000 or above  0.08  0.27   .32  0.47 
Total net wealth (incl.  home equity, net of liabilities)  24095  62677   228950  1740398 
 Median  5000    50000  
Total net wealth (incl. home equity, net of liabilities) 
 is less than 10,000 (omitted category)  0.58  0.49   0.28  0.45 
 between 10,000 and 49,999  0.29  0.45   0.22  0.41 
 at least 50,000  0.13  0.34   0.50  0.50 
Education of household head in number of years  12.6  1.72   13.9  2.30 
Household head has less than 12 years of education (omitted cat.)  0.20  0.40   0.095  0.29 
  finished high school  0.44  0.50   0.27  0.45 
  has some college education  0.27  0.44   0.26  0.44 
  finished college   0.06  0.24   0.27  0.44 
  has at least some postgraduate education  0.03  0.16   0.11  0.31 
Household head is married  0.30  0.46   0.56  0.50 
Household head has been unemployed/laid off during 2000  0.11  0.31   .045  0.21 
Years since household head first formed own household  11.9  6.9   11.8  6.8 
Occupation type (if employed)      
 Professional, Technical, and Kindred Workers  0.12  0.33   0.24  0.43 
 Managers and Administrators, Except Farm  0.070  0.26   0.20  0.40 
 Sales Workers  0.023  0.15   0.074  0.26 
 Clerical and Kindred Workers  0.12  0.33   0.064  0.25 
 Craftsmen and Kindred Workers  0.097  0.30   0.16  0.36 
 Operatives, Except Transport  0.12  0.32   0.055  0.23 
 Transport Equipment Operatives  0.064  0.24   0.050  0.22 
 Laborers, Except Farm  0.040  0.20   0.022  0.15 
 Farmers and farm managers (omitted category)  0  0   0.012  0.11 
 Farm Laborers and Farm Foremen  0  0   0.0029  0.054 
 Service Workers, Except Private Household  0.13  0.34   0.054  0.23 
 Private Household Workers  0.010  0.10   0.0029  0.054 
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TABLE 4—Continued 
Variable List and Summary Statistics for Base Regression Sample 
 
 Blacks (N=298)  Whites (N=685) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
Parental Characteristics in 2001      
Parents’ income  17037  28041   56318  106961 
 Median  500    31929  
Parents’ income 
 none  (omitted category)  0.46  0.50   0.095  0.29 
 more than 0 but less than 35,000  (omitted category)  0.37  0.48   0.42  0.49 
 between 35,000 and 75,000   0.13  0.44   0.25  0.43 
 more than 75,000  0.05  0.21   0.23  0.42 
Parents’ total net wealth (incl. home equity, net of liabilities)  56185  73426   533471  1122946 
 Median  37885    252400  
Parents’ total net wealth (incl. home equity, net of liabilities) is  
 less than 10,000  (omitted category)  0.28  0.45   0.088  0.28 
 between 10,000 and 50,000  0.32  0.47   0.061  0.24 
 greater than 50,000  0.41  0.49   0.85  0.36 
Parents’ (HH head) has less than 12 years of education (omitted 
category: no education at all)  0.54  0.50   0.19  0.39 
 finished high school  0.26  0.44   0.27  0.44 
 has some college education  0.12  0.33   0.18  0.38 
 finished college   0.027  0.16   0.17  0.38 
 has at least some postgraduate education  0.013  0.12   0.17  0.37 
Parents (household head) live in different state than when young  0.37  0.48   0.30  0.46 
      
Parental Characteristics in 1976      
Parents’ income  7097  6234   19355   13596 
 less than 7,500  (omitted category)  0.59  0.49   0.10  0.30 
 between 7,500 and 14,999   0.30  0.46   0.32  0.47 
 between 15,000 and 34,999  0.11  0.31   0.50  0.50 
 greater than 35,000  0  0   0.085  0.28 
Parents’ occupation type (head) (omitted: not employed)      
 Professional, Technical, and Kindred Workers  0.027  0.16   0.22  0.41 
 Managers and Administrators, Except Farm  0.013  0.12   0.15  0.36 
 Sales Workers  0.0067  0.082   0.067  0.25 
 Clerical and Kindred Workers  0.044  0.20   0.020  0.14 
 Craftsmen and Kindred Workers  0.16  0.37   0.24  0.43 
 Operatives, Except Transport  0.12  0.32   0.086  0.28 
 Transport Equipment Operatives  0.10  0.31   0.050  0.22 
 Laborers, Except Farm  0.13  0.34   0.032  0.18 
 Farmers and farm managers  (omitted category)  0.037  0.19   0.039  0.19 
 Farm Laborers and Farm Foremen  0.020  0.14   0.0088  0.093 
 Service Workers, Except Private Household  0.057  0.23   0.041  0.20 
 Private Household Workers   0  0   0  0 
      
Macro-Location Type      
Size of largest city in county of residence is  
 500,000 or more  0.28  0.45   0.12  0.32 
 100,000-499,999  0.28  0.45   0.26  0.44 
 50,000-99,999  0.11  0.31   0.098  0.30 
 25,000-49,999  0.067  0.25   0.16  0.37 
 10,000-24,999  0.12  0.33   0.17  0.38 
 Under 10,000 (omitted category)  0.15  0.36   0.18  0.38 
Notes: The variable list and summary statistics are based on the base regression-sample for 2001. All data is from the PSID 
2001. All cash values are in US-dollar ($). 
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TABLE 5 
 
Binary logit estimate of the housing tenure choice (base regression), 2001 
 
Specification (1) Without Wealth 
(2) 
With Wealth (Linear) 
(3) 
With Wealth (Non-Linear) 
Explanatory Variables Parameter Estimates  
Robust  
Std. Err. 
Parameter 
Estimates  
Robust  
Std. Err. 
Parameter 
Estimates  
Robust  
Std. Err. 
Household (HH) head is black -0.81 ** 0.20 -0.47 * 0.22 -0.26  0.23 
Household income is  
 between 35,000 and 75,000  0.82 ** 0.19 0.65 ** 0.20 0.25  0.23 
 more than 75,000 1.97 ** 0.30 1.27 ** 0.34 0.83 * 0.36 
Total household net wealth (incl. home 
equity but deduct. liabilities) (in ‘000)    0.010 * 0.0045    
Total household net wealth is  
 between 10,000 and 50,000       1.71 ** 0.23 
 more than 50,000        3.30 ** 0.26 
Household head is unemployed -0.85 (*) 0.48 -0.86 (*) 0.48 -0.93 (*) 0.52 
Age of household head is 
 30-34  0.74 ** 0.25 0.58 * 0.24 0.42  0.29 
 35-39 0.77 ** 0.29 0.32  0.30 0.12  0.32 
 40-44 1.20 ** 0.36 0.81 * 0.37 0.74 * 0.37 
 45 or older 1.56 ** 0.43 1.07 * 0.45 0.95 * 0.46 
Household head is married 1.02 ** 0.20 0.97 ** 0.20 1.10 ** 0.23 
Household has  
 one child 0.18  0.24 0.24  0.24 0.29  0.28 
 two children 0.71 ** 0.24 0.72 ** 0.24 0.71 ** 0.26 
 three or more children 0.36  0.29 0.44  0.28 0.52 (*) 0.29 
Household head has 
 finished high school 0.77 ** 0.26 0.61 * 0.26 0.56 * 0.28 
 some college education 0.52 (*) 0.28 0.33  0.28 0.13  0.30 
 finished college  0.77 * 0.34 0.55  0.35 0.28  0.39 
 at least some postgraduate education 0.65  0.44 0.33  0.45 0.32  0.48 
Years since head first formed own HH 0.011  0.019 0.0081   0.18  -0.0043   0.020 
Occupation type dummies (HH head)  Yes   Yes    Yes   
Parental characteristics  No   No    No   
Location type dummies  No   No    No  
Constant -2.07 ** 0.431 -2.03 ** 0.40 -2.46 ** 0.47 
Number of observations  983     983    983 
 
 
Log-likelihood -473.8    -440.3    -378.2   
Pseudo R2  0.30     0.35    0.44   
Percent correct predictions (all) 
 76.7%    80.8%    83.2%   
 among black households 
 75.2%    78.2%    81.5%   
 among white households 
 77.4%    81.9%    83.9%   
Notes: Dependent variable: 1 if household is owner-occupier, 0 if household is renter-occupier. ** Indicates 
significance at the 1 percent level, * indicates significance at the 5 percent level, (*) indicates significance at the 10 
percent level. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. A 0.5 threshold was used to compute the percent of correct 
predictions. 
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TABLE 6 
 
Binary logit estimate of the housing tenure choice (including parental characteristics), 2001 
 
Specification 
(1) 
With Parental Wealth 
(2) 
With Parental Wealth  
and Income 
Explanatory Variables Parameter Estimates  
Robust  
Std. Err. 
Parameter 
Estimates  
Robust  
Std. Err. 
Household head is black -0.20  0.24 -0.21  0.24 
Household income is  
 between 35,000 and 75,000  0.23  0.23 0.22  0.22 
 more than 75,000 0.81 * 0.35 0.81 * 0.36 
Total household net wealth is  
between 10,000 and 50,000 1.71 ** 0.23 1.73 ** 0.23 
 more than 50,000 3.30 ** 0.26 3.30 ** 0.26 
Parents’ household income is  
between 35,000 and 75,000     -0.23  0.27 
 more than 75,000    -0.032  0.30 
Parents’ total household wealth  is  
between 10,000 and 50,000 0.73 * 0.36 0.75 * 0.37 
 more than 50,000 0.72 ** 0.28 0.76 ** 0.30 
Years since head first formed own HH -0.0047  0.21 -0.0060  0.21 
Other socioeconomic and demographic 
variables (unemployment, age, marital status, 
children, education, occupation) 
Yes   Yes   
Location type dummies No   No   
Constant -3.05 ** 0.53 -3.01 ** 0.53 
Number of observations  983  983 
 
Log-likelihood  -374.9  -374.5 
 
Pseudo R2  0.44  0.44 
 
Percent correct predictions (all)  83.2%  83.3% 
 
 among black households  81.9%   82.2% 
 
 among white households  83.8%   83.8% 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: 1 if household is owner-occupier, 0 if household is renter-occupier. ** 
Indicates significance at the 1 percent level, * indicates significance at the 5 percent level, (*) indicates 
significance at the 10 percent level. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. A 0.5 threshold was used to 
compute the percent of correct predictions. 
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TABLE 7 
 
Binary logit estimate of the housing tenure choice  
(including own and parental household wealth and location type), 2001 
 
Specification (1) All households  
(2) 
Blacks  
(3) 
Whites  
Explanatory Variables Parameter Estimates  
Robust  
Std. Err. 
Parameter 
Estimates  
Robust  
Std. Err. 
Parameter 
Estimates  
Robust  
Std. 
Err. 
Household head is black 0.085  0.24       
Household income is  
 between 35,000 and 75,000  0.31  0.24 0.48  0.53 0.30  0.29 
 more than 75,000 1.00 ** 0.36 3.28 ** 1.05 0.76 (*) 0.41 
Total household net wealth is 
between 10,000 and 50,000 1.71 ** 0.23 2.12 ** 0.42 1.63 ** 0.31 
 more than 50,000 3.49 ** 0.29 4.40 ** 0.71 3.45 ** 0.35 
Parents’ total household net wealth 
is between 10,000 and 50,000 0.76 * 0.37 1.46 * 0.65 0.084  0.61 
 more than 50,000 0.82 ** 0.29 0.81  0.63 0.72 (*) 0.39 
Years since head first formed 
own HH 0.031  0.21 0.025  0.045 0.0028  0.028 
Size of largest city in county of 
residence is 
 500,000 or more -1.72 ** 0.35 -2.71 ** 0.69 -1.24 ** 0.45 
 100,000-499,999 -1.11 ** 0.32 -2.87 ** 0.60 -0.48  0.41 
 50,000-99,999 -.0080  0.42 -1.65 * 0.83 0.87 (*) 0.52 
 25,000-49,999 -0.40  0.38 -1.24  0.99 -0.095  0.44 
 10,000-24,999 -0.24  0.33 -0.55  0.68 -0.081  0.41 
Other socioeconomic and 
demographic variables 
(unemployment, age, marital 
status, children, education) 
Yes   Yes   Yes   
Constant -2.50 ** 0.59 -2.78 ** 0.92 -2.86 ** 0.76 
Number of observations 983  298  685  
Log-likelihood -356.4  -94.9  -239.3  
Pseudo R2 0.47  0.51  0.46  
Percent correct predictions (all) 84.2%      
 among black households 82.9%  83.6%    
 among white households 84.8%    84.8%  
Notes: Dependent variable: 1 if household is owner-occupier, 0 if household is renter-occupier. ** Indicates 
significance at the 1 percent level, * indicates significance at the 5 percent level, (*) indicates significance at the 10 
percent level. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. A 0.5 threshold was used to compute the percent of correct 
predictions. 
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TABLE 8 
Ordinary Linear Probability and TSLS Estimates of the Housing Tenure Choice, 2001 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Estimator OLS TSLS  TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS 
Instruments  Broad Set Narrow Set Broad Set Broad Set Narrow Set Narrow Set 
Sample All All All Blacks Whites Blacks Whites 
 -0.029 -0.00077  -0.014     Household head is black 
 (0.035)  (0.046)  (0.054)     
 0.045 ** 
 0.072 **  0.071 **  0.041 *  0.068 **  0.038 *  0.055 (*) Natural log of total household net wealth 
(incl. home equity but deduct. liabilities) (0.0033) 
 (0.020)  (0.027)  (0.017)  (0.022)  (0.017)  (0.031) 
 0.0064 (*) 
 0.0020  -0.0029  0.012  0.0016  0.019  -0.016 Natural log of parents’ total household wealth 
(incl. home equity but deduct. liabilities) (0.0034) 
 (0.011)  (0.017)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.022) 
 0.092 **  0.041  0.046  0.054  0.050  0.049  0.078 Household income is between 35,000 and 
75,000 
 (0.035)  (0.050)  (0.059)  (0.070)  (0.059)  (0.072)  (0.073) 
 0.18 **  0.090  0.097  0.36 **  0.066  0.36 **  0.12 Household income is more than 75,000 
 (0.045)  (0.080)  (0.10)  (0.096)  (0.093)  (0.095)  (0.12) 
Other socioeconomic and demographic 
variables (unemployment, age, marital status, 
children, education, mobility, type of 
occupation, number of years since formed 
own household) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location type dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 0.086  -0.034  0.016  -0.023  -0.094  0.064  0.13 Constant 
 (0.073)  (0.11)  (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.16)  (0.23) 
Observations  983  983  983  298  685  298  685 
Adjusted R-squared  0.48       
Hansen J-statistica): P-value   0.84  0.69  0.36   0.98  0.27  0.97 
Notes: Dependent variable: 1 if household is owner-occupier, 0 if household is renter-occupier. ** Indicates significance at the 1 percent level, * indicates 
significance at the 5 percent level, (*) indicates significance at the 10 percent level. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Bold variables are endogenous. The 
broad set of instruments includes dummy variables for parental household income categories in 1976, dummy variables for the occupation type of the parents 
(household head) when the household was young (in 1976), dummy variables for the level of education of the parents (household head), and a dummy variable 
for whether the parents’ household head lives in different state than when young. The narrow set of instruments excludes the parental household income category 
dummies. a) The Hansen-Sargan test is a test of overidentifying restrictions.  The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments (uncorrelated 
with the error term; excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation). The null hypothesis cannot be rejected in any of the specifications 
reported in columns (2) to (7). 
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TABLE 9 
 
Marginal Analysis, 2001 
 
 
Effect of race (being Black versus being White) on likelihood  
that household is owner-occupier 
Specification Marginal  Effect Elasticity 
Change  
in % points 
Table 5 (1) – no wealth  -0.20 **  -0.098 **  -6.47% ** 
Table 5 (2) – wealth linear  -0.074 *  -0.026 *  -2.16% * 
Table 5 (3) – wealth non-linear  -0.062  -0.030  -1.93% 
Table 6 (1) – add parental wealth  -0.048  -0.024  -1.49% 
Table 6 (2) – parental wealth + income  -0.051  -0.025  -1.58% 
Table 7 (1) – plus macro-location  0.020  0.0099  +0.60% 
Table 8 (1) – OLS  -0.029  -0.016  -0.90% 
Table 8 (2) – TSLS, broad set of instr.  -0.00077  -0.00042  -0.023% 
Table 8 (3) – TSLS, narrow set  -0.014  -0.0075  -0.42% 
 
Effect of change in own wealth from below $10,000 to over 
$50,000 on likelihood that household is owner-occupier 
Table 5 (3) – wealth non-linear  0.60  **  0.49  **  +31.2%  ** 
Table 6 (1) – add parental wealth  0.61  **  0.49  **  +31.1%  ** 
Table 6 (2) – parental wealth + income  0.61  **  0.50  **  +31.2%  ** 
Table 7 (1) – plus macro-location  0.64  **  0.52  **  +31.8%  ** 
Table 7 (2) – same, but Blacks only  0.78  **  0.45  **  +10.8%  ** 
Table 7 (3) – same, but Whites only  0.60  **  0.44  **  +32.7%  ** 
 
Effect of change in own wealth from $10,000 to $50,000 on 
likelihood that household is owner-occupier 
Table 8 (1) – OLS  0.045  **  0.67  **  +6.7%  ** 
Table 8 (2) – TSLS, broad set of instr.  0.072  **  1.08  **  +10.6%  ** 
Table 8 (3) – TSLS, narrow set  0.071  **  1.07  **  +10.5%  ** 
 
Effect of change in parental wealth from below $10,000 to 
over $50,000 on likelihood that household is owner-occupier 
Table 6 (1) – add parental wealth  0.17  **  0.20  **  +12.5%  ** 
Table 6 (2) – parental wealth + income  0.18  **  0.21  **  +13.3%  ** 
Table 7 (1) – plus macro-location  0.20  **  0.23  **  +13.8%  ** 
Table 7 (2) – same, but Blacks only  0.15  0.25  +6.0% 
Table 7 (3) – same, but Whites only  0.15  (*)  0.15  (*)  +11.6%  (*) 
 
Effect of change in parental wealth from $10,000 to $50,000 
on likelihood that household is owner-occupier 
Table 8 (1) – OLS  0.0064  (*)  0.12  (*)  +1.2%  (*) 
Table 8 (2) – TSLS, broad set of instr.  0.0020  0.040  +0.4% 
Table 8 (3) – TSLS, narrow set  -0.0029  -0.06  -0.6% 
 
Effect of move from location with size of largest city in 
county under 10,000 to 500,000 or more 
Table 7 (1) – with macro-location  -0.40  **  -0.11  **  -6.7%  ** 
Table 7 (2) – same, but Blacks only  -0.36  **  -0.56  **  -13.7%  ** 
Table 7 (3) – same, but Whites only  -0.28  **  -0.037  **  -2.8%  ** 
Notes: Marginal effects are for discrete changes of dummy variables from 0 to 1. The marginal effects 
and elasticities are measured at the means of the independent variables.  
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TABLE 10 
 
Relative Risk Ratios of ‘Household Head is Black Variable’, Multinomial Logit, 2001 
 
 
Explanatory Variable: 
Household head is black  
Category 
Relative 
Risk Ratio  
Robust 
Standard Error 
Test on Equality of blackβ  between 
Equations for each Location Type 
Rent in Macro-Location Type 1  3.6 **  1.5 
Own in Macro-Location Type 1  7.0 **  3.6 
 Prob > chi2 = 0.21 † 
Rent in Macro-Location Type 2  2.3 *  0.94 
Own in Macro-Location Type 2  1.7   0.71  Prob > chi2 = 0.46 
†
 
Rent in Macro-Location Type 3  2.9 (*)  1.7 
Own in Macro-Location Type 3  1.1   0.52  Prob > chi2 = 0.15 
†
 
Rent in Macro-Location Type 4  0.62   0.33 
Own in Macro-Location Type 4  1.1   0.52  Prob > chi2 = 0.37 
†
 
Rent in Macro-Location Type 5  0.69   0.34 
Own in Macro-Location Type 5  0.74   0.33  Prob > chi2 = 0.90 
†
 
Rent in Macro-Location Type 6  0.70   0.33 
Own in Macro-Location Type 6  
(= Base Category)  0   
 
Notes: ** Significant at 1 percent level, * significant at the 5 percent level, (*) significant at the 10 percent 
level. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. † The null-hypothesis of equality of relative risk ratios cannot 
be rejected at the 10 percent level. The macro-location types are defined as follows: 1: ‘Size of largest city in 
county of residence is 500,000 or more’; 2: ‘size is 100,000 to 499,999’; 3: ‘size is 50,000 to 99,999’; 4: ‘size 
is 25,000 to 49,999’; 5: ‘size is 10,000 to 24,999’; 6: ‘size is under 10,000’. 
 
     
TABLE 11 
 
Observed and Implied Homeownership Rates based on Multinomial Logit, 2001 
 
 Observed Homeownership Rate Implied Homeownership Rate 
Sample Black White Total Black White Total 
Macro-Location Type 1 0.26 0.48 0.37 0.51 0.39 0.45 
 Deviation from Mean -0.11 0.11  0.06 -0.06  
Macro-Location Type 2 0.28 0.60 0.50 0.45 0.53 0.51 
 Deviation from Mean -0.22 0.10  
-0.06 0.02  
Macro-Location Type 3 0.39 0.85 0.70 0.58 0.77 0.71 
 Deviation from Mean -0.31 0.15  
-0.13 0.06  
Macro-Location Type 4 0.50 0.68 0.65 0.71 0.60 0.62 
 Deviation from Mean -0.15 0.03  0.09 -0.02  
Macro-Location Type 5 0.44 0.66 0.61 0.58 0.58 0.58 
 Deviation from Mean -0.16 0.05  0.00 0.00  
Macro-Location Type 6 0.53 0.67 0.63 0.66 0.59 0.61 
 Deviation from Mean -0.10 0.03  0.05 -0.02  
All locations (all households) 0.36 0.65 0.56 0.55 0.57 0.56 
 Deviation from Mean -0.20 0.09  
-0.01 0.01  
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APPENDIX TABLE A1 
Binary logit estimate of the housing tenure choice, full sample, 2001 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 -0.106   Household head is black 
 (0.095)   
 0.261  *  0.231  0.280  * Household income is between 35,000 
and 75,000 
 (0.104)  (0.186)  (0.129) 
 0.838  **  0.964  **  0.747  ** Household income is more than 75,000 
 (0.167)  (0.371)  (0.193) 
 2.154  **  2.371  **  1.992  ** Total household net wealth is between 
10,000 and 50,000 
 (0.096)  (0.149)  (0.130) 
 3.569  **  3.585  **  3.567  ** Total household net wealth is more than 
50,000 
 (0.113)  (0.197)  (0.142) 
 -1.115  **  -1.585  **  -0.771  ** Size of largest city in county of 
residence is 500,000 or more 
 (0.135)  (0.202)  (0.195) 
 -0.902  **  -1.361  **  -0.626  **  Size of largest city in county of 
residence is 100,000-499,999 
 (0.127)  (0.210)  (0.160) 
 -0.392  *  -0.933  **  -0.069  Size of largest city in county of 
residence is 50,000-99,999 
 (0.165)  (0.283)  (0.200) 
 -0.568  **  -0.756  *  -0.429  *  Size of largest city in county of 
residence is 25,000-49,999 
 (0.153)  (0.295)  (0.179) 
 -0.234  (*)  -0.582  *  -0.029  Size of largest city in county of 
residence is 10,000-24,999 
 (0.137)  (0.245)  (0.166) 
Other socioeconomic and demographic 
variables (unemployment, age, marital 
status, children, education) 
 Yes  Yes  Yes 
 -2.633  **  -2.662  **  -2.797  ** Constant 
 (0.197)  (0.327)  (0.257) 
Number of observations  6105  2023  4082 
Log-likelihood  -2094.0  -781.2  -1288.5 
Pseudo R2  0.47  0.44  0.45 
Percent correct predictions (all)  86.1%   
 among black households  83.3%  83.9%  
 among white households  87.6%   87.6% 
Notes: Dependent variable: 1 if household is owner-occupier, 0 if household is renter-
occupier. ** Indicates significance at the 1 percent level, * indicates significance at the 5 
percent level, (*) indicates significance at the 10 percent level. Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. A 0.5 threshold was used to compute the percent of correct predictions. 
 
 
 
